Abstract: Upper bound of efficiency loss is a valuable issue for transport network design and planning. This paper initially explores it in a taxed stochastic traffic network whose equilibrium flow pattern is deduced by a cross-nested Logit (CNL) flow assignment model, and a centrally controlling Stackelberg strategy. With the assumptions of separability, nondecreasingness, and convexity of the link time function and the fixed origin-destination (OD) demand of network, the equivalent variational inequality for a CNL-based stochastic user equilibrium (CNL-SUE) model is established and first used to obtain upper bounds on Stackelberg network inefficiency. Further, for low-degree link time function such as Bureau of Public Roads and the affine forms, their inefficiency upper bounds are analyzed with some meaningful results.
INTRODUCTION
How is the efficiency loss of users' selfish route choice behaviors affected by traffic assignment model, stochastic factor in traveler route selection, routing strategies, and tax schemes? Attempting to contribute to this practical end, this paper makes great efforts to investigate their combined impacts on the inefficiency upper bound.
The price of anarchy concept dates back to 1999 when Koutsoupias and Papadimitrious [1] first proposed to determine the efficiency losses caused by the non-cooperative behavior of users in telecommunication network. The POA coined by Papadimitriou (2001) [2] for a non-atomic congestion game is determined by looking for the worst possible ratio between the total cost incurred by players in an user equilibrium (UE) situation and of a system optimum (SO). Hereafter the efficiency loss and its upper bound of traffic equilibrium received much attention [3] [4] [5] . Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) [3] first used the concept of POA [1] to upper bound the efficiency loss and proved that the total travel time of a UE is at most 1/3 higher than in a SO if the latency functions are linear with nonnegative coefficients. Chau and Sim (2003) [6] and [5] studied the efficiency loss of transportation equilibrium problem with elastic demand.
None of the above researches considers Stackelberg routing strategies. Among Stackelberg strategies, the SCALE is a popular one whose effectiveness has been analyzed [7, 8] . Scholars have investigated the impact of Stackelberg routing to reduce the UE cost in network routing [7, 9, 10] . In simplest graphs with parallel links and latency functions of special simplified form as the inverse of the minus of link capacity and link flow, Korilis et al. (1997) [9] first applied Stackelberg strategy controlling a fraction of flow as a means to improve system performance considering atomic, unsplittable routing decision. From then on, some works of Stackelberg policy developed to improve the POA such as Roughgarden (2004) [11] , Stier- Moses (2004) [12] , Karakostas and Kolliopoulos (2009) [10] on parallel-link or general graph, primarily for linear latency functions.
Furthermore, due to an absence of road pricing that originated from Pigou (1920) [13] , the demand-supply equilibrium of road network settles at a suboptimal point bringing about the negative externality. Such inefficiency pervades many road networks during peak hours. For that reason, there emerge few researches focusing on the impact of tax schemes on POA [5, 14] . Such works involve a demand-adjusting tax-charging policy under currently deteriorated urban traffic condition to obtain different and intensive insights into the POA of transport network.
Despite of the employment of Stackelberg strategies or tax schemes, the existing researches on POA bound mainly focus on deterministic traffic assignment, i.e. UE, while the few on stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) assignment just adopting multinomial Logit (MNL) model [15] , the simplest one in Logit families. For example, Guo et al. (2010) [16] gave the bound of POA of Logit-based stochastic user equilibrium, Yu et al. (2009) [17] investigated the upper bound of SUE's inefficiency. It is well known that different models lead to network different flow assignment pattern and hence different inefficiency. Previous studies on price of anarchy (POA) usually adopt. However, UE is so simple, and MNL cannot deal with path overlapping characteristics, which could be perfectly. Therefore, it is of great significance to employ cross-nested Logit (CNL) model [18, 19] that can capture path correlation to find POA upper bound in network flow assignment. CNL model has been mentioned for the first time by Vovsha (1997) [20] in the context of a mode choice survey in Israel, and be applied to route choice problem by Prashker and Bekhor (1998) [18] , and so on.
Since most researches on POA bound apply MNL model, presented in the absence of either Stackelberg strategy, or stochastic user equilibrium, or tax scheme, CNL-SUE induced by Stackelberg strategy in this paper cooperates with weak Stackelberg policy and tax scheme to improve the upper bound of inefficiency stemming from the stochastic selfish route selection behavior. Network tolls imposed by a central authority on edges help to drive the Stackelberginduced stochastic user equilibrium towards system performance improving state. Section 2 presents the problem studied with basic symbols and concepts. Assuming that link time function is separable and monotonic and that OD demand is fixed, Section 3 formulates the equivalent variational inequalities (VI) for the CNL-based SUE model induced by weak Stackelberg strategy and tax scheme. Further, Section 4 analyzes and establishes POA upper bound on taxed Stackelberg CNL-SUE. In Section 5, POA upper bounds are analyzed for the cases of low-degree link time functions, i.e. typical BPR function and its affine form. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. UE is inefficient achieved from noncooperative selfish behaviors, without consideration of entire social objectives, which leads to network performance degradation. As to SUE assignment where each user also cannot decrease his travel cost by unilaterally deviating from his path, it is the expansion of UE assignment. A Stackelberg stochastic user equilibrium problem, for traffic network, is defined by embedding SUE traffic model into a Stackelberg network framework, with leader system pursuing optimum and follower system stochastic Nash equilibrium. Leading users of a fixed fraction centrally controlled by a network manager choose optimal paths in any desired way to minimize total system travel time, and the others acting as followers influenced by the leaders attempt to choose their routes under SUE assignment. A weak Stackelberg strategy [21] is defined as a feasible path flow pattern f that satisfies v v a E , the use of which has been proved not to increase the price of anarchy [22] . According to the proof by Smith (1979) [23] , a lemma is given as following. 
STACKELBERG STOCHASTIC EQUILIBRIUM IN TAXED NETWORK
denote the total system travel time at Stackelberg Nash equilibrium assignment. We are interested in the price of anarchy defined by eq * so Stochastic user equilibrium models are established based on the assumption of variations in travelers' perception, due to perhaps different cognition of the traffic network, of the travel costs along the link. The perceived travel costs can be expressed as the extension of travel cost functions in deterministic traffic model by including random parts. The most widely used SUE model is the multinomial Logit (MNL) model obtained assuming that the random terms are independently and identically distributed Gumbel variables. Other than MNL, Cross-nested Logit (CNL) model is another typical case in Logit family. MNL is simple but cannot capture path correlation structure, while CNL is just the opposite. CNL [18, 19] models correlation through discrete choice model and the distribution assumption of error items. Prashker and Bekhor (1998) [18] applied CNL to route choice problem. CNL model allow more flexible error structure by applying a two-level tree structure. We put the CNL choice probability of route r between OD pair w in hierarchical road network as follows ( ) ( ) 
VI FOR CNL-SUE WITH STACKELBERG STRAT-EGY AND TAX SCHEME
In terms of the assumption that the link time function is separable and monotonically increasing with link flow, and that the network OD demand is fixed, the equivalent variational inequality formulation for the cross-nested Logitbased SUE model is given as following. is the nonempty, convex, and compact set of feasible path flow pattern.
Proof. According to Prashker and Bekhor (1998) [18] , the above cross-nested Logit-based SUE model can be formulated as the following equivalent mathematical programming problem (MP1) 
In terms of the first-order optimality conditions, we have
So for fixed traffic demand, this conditions generates 
Then, choice probability of link (nest) r e E can be obtained by (13) and (14) 
i.e., variational inequality (4) follows. So the proof is completed.
GENERAL RESULTS OF POA UPPER BOUND ON TAXED STACKELBERG CNL-SUE
Applying the above variational inequality (17) (21) Accompanying with the definition of ( ; , , ) a a a a t v u by (18) and variational inequality (21) , the cost of induced network flow can be bounded as formula (20) .
Remark1. Formula (20) can be expressed equivalently as price of anarchy ( ) 
Proof. By the definition of ( ; , , ) 
has the maximum value of 
POA UPPER BOUND FOR LOW-DEGREE LINK TIME FUNCTIONS
Now, we are going to display graphically the upper bounds for SUE. The analytical solution to the equation (25) of high-degree (especially 5 p ) is difficult to obtain, so we take the cases of low degree of power law for examples. In the remaining space, numerical analyses with figures are presented to examine the relationship of POA upper bound with weak Stackelberg controlling factor and tax coefficient a k .
Furthermore, to verify the correctness of the foregoing conclusions, and to achieve better understanding of the issue studied, we consider the POA upper bounds for affine link time function, a special case of the BPR function, in Stackelberg network under SUE and tax scheme.
According to the analysis process for BPR stated above, we have ( ) -value affects K -value little from ref. [16] . If the values and 0 c are fixed, K is determined by and decreasing with parameter , that is to say, a weaker randomness means a smaller K . For 0.1 K = , the relation of POA with Stackelberg controlling fraction and nested degree μ is depicted as Fig. (1) . , the POA -a k relationship shows that: for the same value of , a bigger K means a bigger the upper bound of POA and a slower decreasing amplitude of inefficiency upper bound. Corollary3 also implies that, when takes a larger value, the decrease rate of upper bound arrives a reduced magnitude, i.e., a diminishing marginal effect of the central controlling fraction to decrease upper bound.
